93 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
93 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
# Self-reflection 2026-09-03
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Analysed 11 sessions in 1 batches. Findings: 7 (3 to review, 4 watched).
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Window: from 2026-08-13, batches 1/1.
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Known patterns: 27.3 occurrences / 100 sessions (previous run 100.0).
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## fe72a · `retry-without-diagnosis` [open/medium] — REGRESSION
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New occurrences of the known pattern: after an exec safety-guard block the agent retried a near-identical command form without isolating the cause. In the moisture-meter session the tr-pipe was re-sent with working_dir added — a second variable changed at once and the same guard error returned, wasting a turn; the diagnosis that the tool-results path itself is outside the boundary came only afterwards. In the project session the heredoc log command was blocked and immediately retried as a modified variant without first naming the suspected cause aloud.
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**Occurrences:** 69× in 9 sessions · first seen 2026-09-02, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:fd9a49af-c659-4195-8b07-2d6bb556b5e7` 2026-09-02 — exec tr pipe -> ERROR guard; retry same command + working_dir -> ERROR guard, only then switch to grep tool
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- `websocket:50ba97da-8821-4adc-aa93-5b82b65077a3` 2026-09-02 — project_cli.py log with heredoc -> ERROR guard; next attempt still a shell form with the long text inline before the tmp-file workaround
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- `websocket:6f8fcc41` 2026-08-31 — naradi-extol.cz fetched with maxChars 5000, spec table did not render, same URL refetched with extractMode text and maxChars 4000 — identical target, smaller budget, no strategy change
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- `websocket:41eaf5b3` 2026-08-31 — after a 403 on vseinstrumenti.ru reviews page, another vseinstrumenti.ru page was fetched and returned 403 again; several marketplace pages returned 300-600 B degenerate outputs without the block mode being named
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- `c745618e` 2026-08-29 — web_fetch ollama.com/library/glm-5.3-flash:cloud → ok ale truncated; refetch maxChars 3500 → truncated; refetch maxChars 3000 → truncated; refetch via r.jina.ai 2500 → truncated; refetch freellm.net; teprve šestý pokus (endpoint /tags) přinesl usage tier okamžitě
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- `websocket:f6e1e265-7a37-451c-ad7a-f601c40fdc5a` 2026-08-28 — web_fetch unix.stackexchange.com/questions/579818 -> ERROR 403 Forbidden, later web_fetch the same URL again -> ERROR 403 Forbidden
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**Proposal:** Reinforce the AGENTS.md exec rule with the concrete most common cause: guard blocks are usually triggered by paths appearing in the command string (absolute paths, .nanobot/tool-results, inline -c with path substrings), not by missing working_dir — write the payload to tmp/ first and keep the command string path-free.
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## f3f64 · `tool-results-file-not-readable-directly` [open/medium]
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The agent repeatedly tried to read its own cached web_fetch results with the wrong tools and wrong assumptions: read_file with a line offset failed because the tool-result cache is a single-line JSON file; then exec pipes over the same file were blocked by the safety guard because the relative path resolves outside the working dir. In both cases the failure mode was knowable after the first error (single-line JSON inside .nanobot/tool-results), yet the agent kept guessing new access forms — including a raw sed -i on /dev/null — before landing on the workable one (a tmp/ python script with a r…
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**Occurrences:** 2× in 2 sessions · first seen 2026-09-03, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:fd9a49af-c659-4195-8b07-2d6bb556b5e7` 2026-09-02 — read_file(offset=40, path=.nanobot/tool-results/...call_4nlfx9iy.txt) -> ERROR offset beyond end of file (1 lines); exec tr pipe over same path -> ERROR guard; retry with working_dir -> ERROR guard; finally grep tool -> ok but whole file is one line JSON
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- `websocket:afe450d5-cca9-4419-b930-1ebcb69b7c4e` 2026-09-02 — grep on call_f3lus52v.txt returned whole file as one line; inline uv run python -c with the tool-results path -> ERROR guard; then 6 successive rewrites of tmp/extract_wiki.py iterating on the same cached JSON
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**Proposal:** Add a short rule to AGENTS.md exec/file sections: cached fetch results live in .nanobot/tool-results as single-line JSON — do not read_file with offsets and do not exec over them (guard blocks the path); when content extraction is needed, write a tmp/ python script using a relative path and uv run with working_dir set to workspace root.
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## f706e · `guard-block-cause-misattributed` [open/medium]
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The agent systematically misdiagnoses what the exec safety guard blocks, then states the wrong mechanism to the user as fact. In the bits session the agent told the user the guard blocked because of an inline python -c with an absolute path — but the same form had succeeded minutes earlier in the same session, and the later block of a second inline python -c was blamed on quoting while the actual trigger stayed unidentified. In the same session the agent also told the user it has no tool that can delete a file (rm blocked by deny pattern) and left 4 diagnostic scripts in tmp/ — rm via the del…
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**Occurrences:** 2× in 2 sessions · first seen 2026-09-03, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:afe450d5-cca9-4419-b930-1ebcb69b7c4e` 2026-09-02 — rm -f tmp/extract_wiki.py -> ERROR deny pattern; agent then claims nemám tool na smazání, který guard projde and leaves the file
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- `websocket:50ba97da-8821-4adc-aa93-5b82b65077a3` 2026-09-02 — rm cleanup attempted once, blocked, agent tells user it cannot delete its 4 tmp scripts and leaves them in the workspace
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**Proposal:** When a claim about own tooling limitations or guard mechanisms is about to be stated to the user, verify it with one cheap test first (e.g. try deleting via a workspace-relative form) or state explicitly it is unverified; never claim a capability does not exist after a single blocked attempt.
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## f39f2 · `reflect-finding-invented-from-truncated-read` [watch/high]
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During a /reflect review the agent presented a detailed open finding (tool-call-leaked-as-text, 12 occurrences in 6 sessions, labeled regression of f0720) that did not exist in the findings store. The root cause: findings.jsonl reads are truncated at 16 kB, and the agent reconstructed the open-findings list from the truncated tail instead of re-reading with offset or grepping before presenting. Consequences: a reject was executed against a guessed ID (f9a4b), several greps to chase the phantom record, and the user was told to delete something that did not exist — only caught because reject of…
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**Occurrences:** 1× in 1 sessions · first seen 2026-09-03, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:2ad0a447-de89-4e24-9377-d91113ffa50b` 2026-09-02 — user: tak kdyz uz ho mame, tak nalez muzes smazat; agent rejects guessed id f9a4b -> no finding with id; multiple greps; agent admits: Finding [2/6], jak jsem ho představil, v store neexistuje — byla to zkomolená duplicita už aplikovaného f0720
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- `websocket:2ad0a447-de89-4e24-9377-d91113ffa50b` 2026-09-02 — earlier in same session: read findings.jsonl -> 16.0 kB truncated, open list built from truncated content without follow-up paged read
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**Proposal:** Add to the reflect skill workflow: before presenting any finding, its ID must come from a fresh grep/read of the store, and truncated reads (16 kB cap) must be followed by an offset read until EOF; never present a finding whose ID was not observed verbatim in the store output.
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## f81b5 · `patch-workaround-sed-devnull` [watch/medium]
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While preparing a reflect patch the agent attempted an exec command that piped sed output to /dev/null — an obviously无效 form that was certain to be blocked by the safety guard, sent without any diagnostic purpose. This is not a retry after block (it was a first attempt) but a variant of choosing a shell one-liner where a sanctioned tool exists: the edit could have been done with write_file of the patch JSON directly, as was done successfully seconds later.
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**Occurrences:** 1× in 1 sessions · first seen 2026-09-03, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:7a988478-e08c-4346-ba1c-a86d680b4d8a` 2026-09-02 — exec sed -i ... /dev/null; true -> ERROR guard; immediately replaced by write_file tmp script which worked
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**Proposal:** Skip — near-single occurrence, but worth noting as an instance of the broader rule already in AGENTS.md: prefer file tools over shell text manipulation; the sed form served no purpose a write_file could not.
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## f32cc · `answer-self-config-from-guesswork` [watch/medium]
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New occurrence of the known applied pattern: the user asked why outputs are unstable with a specific model on mobile; the agent speculated about three mechanisms (different preset on mobile session, compaction of long context, tool failures) without checking the session index or config first, and stated channel has no effect on model quality as fact. The actual session record was only inspected after the user pushed (rozhodne zjisti co se stalo). Parts of the speculation were later shown wrong or unverifiable — the session was webui, the answer was complete and sourced, so the perceived insta…
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**Occurrences:** 1× in 1 sessions · first seen 2026-09-03, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:50ba97da-8821-4adc-aa93-5b82b65077a3` 2026-09-02 — first answer lists 3 speculative causes (jiný preset na mobilní session, kompakce kontextu, tools se nepoužily) before any session inspection; after investigation: Mobil vliv nemá, odpověď byla kompletní a ověřená
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**Proposal:** For questions about own past behavior or runtime, inspect the session/config records before answering; label unchecked mechanisms explicitly as hypotheses, never as explanations.
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## f9ea6 · `re-search-own-history-instead-of-target-store` [watch/low]
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When asked to reconstruct a past event, the agent greps Dream memory and history.jsonl first even though session transcripts are the store that actually contains the event. In the project-ai session two greps on memory/history.jsonl produced nothing before the agent remembered sessions/ exists and found the record immediately — a recurrence of diagnosis-without-checking-own-logs-first with the store choice inverted (wrong store first, right store second).
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**Occurrences:** 1× in 1 sessions · first seen 2026-09-03, last seen 2026-09-02
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**Evidence:**
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- `websocket:50ba97da-8821-4adc-aa93-5b82b65077a3` 2026-09-02 — grep memory/history.jsonl for normy/Pozidriv -> no hits; grep -i retry -> no hits; only then ls sessions/ and grep sessions/ -> immediate hit
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**Proposal:** For questions about what happened in a past conversation, search sessions/ transcripts first; history.jsonl and MEMORY.md are consolidation stores and rarely contain verbatim queries.
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